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ARTICLE
In Defense of the "Old" Public Health
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGULATION
OF PUBLIC HEALTH*
RichardA. Epsteint

ABSTRACT
The traditional forms of public health law were directed
largely toward communicable diseases and other externalities, such
as pollution, with negative health impacts. The more modern view
treats any health issue as one of public health so long as it affects
large numbers of individuals, and this definition includes such
matters as obesity and diabetes. This paper examines the historical
and constitutional evolution of the public health principle as it moved
from the narrower to the broader conception. It then argues that the
narrower principle better defines the appropriate scope of coercive
government intervention than the broader definition, which could
easily authorize intervention in economic affairs whose indirect
effects are likely to reduce overall social wealth and freedom, and in
turn, the overall health levels of the population.
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INTRODUCTION: THE MYSTIQUE OF PUBLIC HEALTH

In April of 2003 I had the honor to deliver the keynote
address at a conference on obesity sponsored by the American
Enterprise Institute. The room was filled with people who
specialized in this growing area and who had a deep
professional commitment to eliminating a condition that has
been rightly linked to discomfort, disability, and death. For
reasons that often resonate in political and academic circles,
especially in Washington, D.C., most of these people strongly
supported various forms of government intervention to respond
to the rising peril of obesity. They held deep convictions that
the bad eating habits of Americans have grown worse and that
profit-seeking corporations have manipulated the situation to
serve their vested interest in peddling foods with
instantaneous allure but long-term detrimental effects. The
belief in consumer sovereignty and rationality was not strongly
in evidence, and my own speech, which countered the
prevailing wisdom, received a chilly reception in many quarters
- hardly a first in my academic career. But the point that
struck me most on that occasion had little to do with the
content of the arguments pro and con for the use of regulation
in this context. Rather, it was that all the members of the
public health service who attended the event appeared in
uniform. They looked and acted as though they were part of the
military establishment, complete with medals, bars, and
stripes.
This observation relates to more than esthetics, for it
illuminates the popular attitude toward public health. Most
people start with the naive assumption that when matters of
public health are on the table, claims for individual liberty
normally must give way. The usual thinking about this subject
is that preserving the public health is an essential state
function that cries out for the use of coercive powers. Deciding
whether a given activity counts as a public health function
therefore tells us about the legitimacy of government
intervention.1 Modern interventionists have seized on these
associations to expand government power by defending a wide
new account of public health.
1

See Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSP.

BIOLOGY MED. S199, at S202.
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The traditional position by and large reserved the
strong powers of the state to containing epidemics, contagion,
and nuisances, which, for reasons that I shall presently
discuss, do not lend themselves effectively to either market
solutions or to private actions in tort. The newer definitions of
public health offer, in contrast, a cornucopia of good practices
that combine all the elements of the traditional system with
new topics involving everything from improving patient care to
redressing inequalities of wealth and fortune that might
contribute to differential health outcomes. The set of
interventions proposed in these cases therefore go far beyond
inspection, quarantine, and vaccination to include such diverse
matters as medical malpractice liability, access to health care,
privacy, and the alleviation of poverty by redressing overall
economic inequalities of wealth.' The language of this
conception's defenders best states what it requires:
The broad pole of public health defines a very wide scope of
organized activities, concerned not only with the provision of all
types of health services, preventive and therapeutic, but also with
the many other components relevant to the operation of a national
health system. These involve questions of health behavior and the
environment as well as the production of resources (personnel and
facilities), the organization of programs, the development of
economic support, and the many strategies required to ensure equity
and quality in the distribution of health services.3

In his similar account of the scope of public health,
Lawrence Gostin quite consciously entwines old functions
(which are, rightly, never abandoned) with new ones:
The mission of public health is broad, encompassing systematic
efforts to promote physical and mental health and to prevent
disease, injury and disability. The core functions of public health
agencies are to prevent epidemics, protect against environmental
hazards, promote healthy behaviors, respond to disasters and assist
communities in recovery, and assure the quality and accessibility of
health care services. 4

In essence, the new definition sees public health as
including all measures to protect individual or collective health
that are not involved with the treatment of given individuals
2

See, e.g., Norman Daniels et al., Why Justice is Good for Our Health: The

Social Determinantsof Health Inequalities,DAEDALUS, Fall 1999, at 215 (1999).
' THEODORE H. TULCHINSKY & ELENA A. VARAvIKOvA, THE NEW PUBLIC
HEALTH: AN INTRODUCTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY xix (2000).
' LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 1617 (2000).
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within a medical setting. It includes dealing directly with risks
of communicable disease, and of course pollution, but only to
the extent that these are directly linked to particular
pathogens or substances, as opposed to larger behavioral and
ecological accounts of the determinants of health.' It may well
be that some overall improvement in the income or wealth of
society will improve public health, but these general
improvements, of which there have been many, correlate no
more closely with public health issues than to a thousand other
measures of individual happiness and satisfaction.
As Mark Hall has emphasized, these are worthy goals,
but they are not public health goals as such.' All arguments
about the proper response to each of these questions are a fair
subject of debate. One could argue that tort law should
dominate contract in medical malpractice, or the reverse. One
could argue that protecting medical privacy through regulation
is central to health care, or the reverse. One could argue that
income and wealth distribution are critical to the just society,
or the reverse. My thesis here is not to quiet that debate;
rather, my thesis is that we should discuss these issues for
what they are and evaluate them as such - not as a branch of
public health law where the case for government intervention
(which I generally oppose in these areas) gets that extra boost
of legitimacy. More concretely, I oppose these proposals not
only because they have dubious ends, but more critically
because their means, such as the pursuit of economic equality,
will likely push strongly in the opposite direction when the full
range of factors exerts its force.
In approaching this hot topic, I shall deal with the
problem not only as one of contemporary choice but also as one
with historical and constitutional dimensions. I shall trace the
nineteenth century (or at least the late-nineteenth century)
conception of public health and argue that it is in many ways
superior to the rival versions that recently have gained ground.
In making this argument, I do not defend each and every
nineteenth century decision or policy, or worse, believe that the
then-common forms of state regulation had no downside. Quite
the opposite, I think that "the dark side" to nineteenth century

' Lawrence 0. Gostin, et aL, The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of
Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59 (1999), criticized in
Hall, supra note 1, at S206.
6 Hall, supra note 1, at S206.
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regulation, as William Novak has called it, 7 clearly surfaces in
the eagerness with which late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century judges sustained racial segregation in public and
private life under the then-regnant account of the police power,
which treated racial purity as a legitimate objective of
government. Recall that in Plessy v. Ferguson,8 the Supreme
Court scored a regrettable trifecta when in a single decision it
sustained, over the lone dissent of Justice John Marshall
Harlan, state antimiscegenation laws, segregation in railroad
transportation, and segregated schools. This decision, most
definitely, did not show any respect for the laissez-faire
tradition of limited government that I staunchly defend.
Instead, the Supreme Court let down its guard against the
dangers of faction and abuse in political systems, a stance
made intolerable by the systematic exclusion of blacks from the
electorate. As such, its decision was antithetical to everything
that laissez-faire stands for.
Let me stress therefore at the outset that my purpose
here is not to defend any and all nineteenth century police
power decisions, but only that strand of cases consistent with
the vision of limited government that animated the old
tradition of public health. I am therefore quite happy to admit
- make that insist - that there are individual decisions, as
Novak has argued, as illiberal and indefensible as one could
imagine.
My point here is narrow but important: the limited set
of ends in the older tradition of public health is superior to the
modern, more capacious view, which encompasses all areas
that affect the health of ordinary individuals. I believe that
today's broad (and meddlesome) definition of public health will
compromise the health of the very individuals its proponents
seek to protect. That definition extends regulation into areas
where it ought not operate, sapping the material resources and
political focus from responding to matters more appropriate for
regulation, such as the spread of communicable diseases or
public nuisances like widespread pollution. The correct theory
of public health tracks the economic conception of public goods,
' See William J. Novak, Private Wealth and Public Health: A Critique of
Richard Epstein's Defense of the Old Public Health, 46 PERSP. BiO.& MED. S176, S19091 (2003). Indeed, I thought that I had made the same point myself. See Richard A.
Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: A Defense of the 'Old' Public Health, 46
PERSP. Bio.& MED. S138, S147-48.
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Novak, supra note 7.
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namely those nonexcludable goods that cannot be given to one
unless they are also given to another."0 In contrast to public
goods, public bads are inflicted upon others without their
consent, as are communicable diseases and pollution, but not
obesity or genetic diseases.
In dealing with the definition of public health, one must
resist the temptation of insisting "better safe than sorry," or it
is "best to err on the side of safety." That maxim works as a
double-edged sword, for the risks of overregulation count not
solely in dollars and cents but also in terms of negative safety
effects. In risk regulation, the "perils of prudence" impel the
overregulation of remote risks under worst-case hypotheses. As
Albert Nichols and Richard Zeckhauser argued some time ago,
overregulation could increase, not reduce, risk." Their target
was the regrettable tendency to use unreliable and alarmist
estimates in areas concededly subject to government
regulation, such as cancer control. But the basic point also can
be analogized to unwise regulation passed in the name of
health or safety, as with the broad definition of public health.
That broader definition justifies interference with contractual
arrangements (such as for providing vaccines) that could save
lives, while undercutting the control of communicable diseases
such as AIDS.
In order to develop these themes, Part II outlines in
greater detail the difference between the old and new accounts
of public heath. Part III outlines the two rival accounts of
public health as they apply to both questions of individual
rights and matters of federal and state power, where they play
an important if underappreciated role. Part IV examines the
parallel treatment of the term "public" in the time-honored
expression "affected with the public interest," which in the
nineteenth century was a restricted condition in which the
state, under the police power, could regulate the rates that
private firms charged in the market place. The next two
sections examine the parallel evolution of the term "public" in
connection with public health. Part V traces the term's use in
connection with quarantine, vaccination, and regulation under
the police power in the period before 1937 when, roughly
10

For the classical account, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE

ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).

"1 Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How
Conservative Risk Assessments Distort Risk Regulation, REGULATION, NovJDec. 1986,
at 13.
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speaking, the use of government power conformed to a classical
liberal model. Section VI then extends that analysis forward
into the modern period, examining these same heads of
liability. A short conclusion follows.
II. THE OLD PUBLIC HEALTH
Salus Populi Suprema Lex. "The well being of the public
is the supreme law." That hoary legal maxim is not a ringing
endorsement of the welfare state in an age of technological
progress. Rather, that Latin maxim is as old as the law itself,
2
with powerful roots even in the American political tradition."
Taken at face value, it embodies the basic proposition that
individual liberty, especially on matters of public health, must
bow to the common good. Thus, the state may justifiably use
public force to achieve that end. In many nations, this maxim
remains a matter of political prudence, guiding legislative and
administrative decision making. In the United States, however,
our constitutional structure surely raises the stakes, as it
explicitly protects liberty and property against both state and
federal regulation. The command that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law""
contains both substantive and procedural dimensions."
On its face, this categorical provision does not permit
any regulation that trenches on liberty or property.
Historically, however, the protection of liberty and property
has never been read absolutely. Rather, in light of the longstanding maxim, the protection of liberty and property as a
constitutional matter has always been subject to an implied
exception under the so-called police power. The grand question,
in which the disputes over public health form a part, is: How
far does (or should) this elusive police power extend? On the
modern view it reaches to any matter of general public interest
or concern, including health in its broadest signification. The
law makes little attempt to identify separate headings of the
police power, such as public health, that operate as limited
exceptions to the general presumption in favor of protecting
liberty and property. It makes even less attempt to identify any
12

WiLLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN

NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 9 (1996).
'3 U.S. CONST. amend. V (binding the federal government);

id. amend. XIV
(binding the states).
" See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897).
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category of regulation that lies outside the police power. In
contrast, the earlier period of our constitutional history roughly speaking, any time before 1937 - did recognize an
ample police power, whose extent has been documented in
William Novak's book "The People's Welfare."'5
At this point, I do not wish to deal with doctrinal
variations in the formative period of the Constitution. Novak is
surely correct to note that most of the police power
jurisprudence developed in the period after the Civil War when
the nation faced the multiple challenges associated with the
rapid industrialization of the economy.'" The birth and growth
of what are now called network industries, such as railroads
and telephones, gave rise to extensive legislation and litigation.
The period also witnessed extensive regulation to preserve
common pool assets, such as wildlife, threatened with mass
extinction by over-hunting. But these new challenges should
not be used to obscure the only point that I wish to make here.
No one ever doubted, either before or after the Civil War, that
controlling diseases and contagions, by quarantine if necessary,
fell within the state's police power. Nor, on the other side, did
the state ever invoke the police power to mandate unwilling
hospitals to admit patients or prevent hospitals from
discriminating on the ground of a prior medical condition. To
the contrary, the state stoutly protected the autonomy of these
institutions during that period.' The police power was
extensive and subject to variations. But no one could mistake
the earlier conceptions for the latter ones simply by stressing
the levels of evolution within the doctrine.
To some, the broad use of the police power during the
nineteenth century decisively refutes the contention that the
late nineteenth century was a halcyon period during which the
American economy thrived unshackled by any and all forms of
government regulation. In its place stood, as Novak has urged,
the view that state limitations on private power did not assist
economic development but rather in creating "a special sphere
of social activity, distinctively cognizable as an object of
governance."' 8 But no careful defender of laissez-faire has ever
5 See NOVAK, supra note 12.
Novak, supra note 7, at S186-88.
See, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts, 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
See NOVAK, supra note 12, at 86. In his jacket blurb, Robert Gordon writes:
"[Novak] blasts to pieces the surprisingly hardy myth of laissez-faire, the libertarian
fantasy that until the twentieth century the American state left private property
owners and economic entrepreneurs alone."
"
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confused property and liberty with anarchy; all have indeed
recognized the case for some state regulation under the police
power. Even though the classical writers on the subject, such
as Ernst Freund, 9 were reluctant to offer any precise or
comprehensive definition of the term, the received wisdom
confined its application to laws and regulations that advanced
the public safety, health, and morals as well as the catchall
0 It is therefore critical to develop a
general welfare category."
test to determine whether the nineteenth-century cases
conformed to or deviated from the laissez-faire vision of limited
government, and if so, in what areas. Endlessly reciting
instances of state nuisance regulation does not answer that
question, for these regulations in principle comport with both
the broader and narrower conceptions of the police power. The
acid test lies elsewhere. Can one find the use of the police
power to sustain any overtly anticompetitive or protectionist
program, where the former evinces a preference for competition
in domestic labor markets and the latter for open markets
across state boundaries?" For example, so-called labor statutes,
which regulated the terms and conditions of employment
contracts, would be permissible under the broader definition of
a well-regulated society, but not under the traditional
definition of the police power, which defined labor statutes in
opposition to health and safety statutes. In more modern
terms, labor statutes were those whose anticompetitive effects
dominated, so that they fell outside the pre-1937 scope of the
police power." The same was true for rate regulation in
ordinary businesses not "affected by the public interest.""
19See, e.g., ERNST FREUND,
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904).
2

THE POLICE POWER:

PUBLIC POLICY AND

See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 12, at 13-17. "The police power is the inherent

plenary power of a State . . . to prescribe regulations to preserve and promote the
public safety, health, and morals, and to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort and
welfare of society." Id. at 13 (quoting Lewis Hockheimer, Police Power, 44 CENT. L.J.
158 (1897)).
21 In making this analysis, recall that the foreign commerce clause was
drafted with explicit protectionist impulses to present a unified front in negotiation
with European powers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton). But
Hamilton also envisioned "an unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves
will advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not
only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign markets."

Id.
' See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down a law
that required mandatory collective bargaining on the railroads); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1914) (striking down a state statute that required mandatory collective
bargaining on the railroads).
" See infra Part III.
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Novak's exhaustive compilation of the nineteenth century uses
of the police power unduly stresses the admitted scope of the
powers while ignoring the limitations on them.24 At no point
does he list even one regulation that cuts against ordinary
competition or in favor of protectionism. His selective vision is
as important with respect to public health as with everything
else. No one questions that the police power has emphatically
applied to matters of public health and safety, but only in a
manner consistent with the then-prevailing constitutional
agenda.
Extensive litigation has tested the exact limits of that
power, but public health has always rested at its core. In
upholding a compulsory vaccination law against smallpox,
Justice Harlan put the matter this way in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts"- a case to which we shall return at length:
Although this court has refrained from any attempt to define the
limits of that power, yet it has distinctly recognized the authority of
a State to enact quarantine laws and "health laws of every
description;" indeed, all laws that relate to matters completely
within its territory and which do not by their necessary operation
affect the people of other States. According to settled principles the
police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such
reasonable regulations, established directly by legislative enactment
as will protect the public health and the public safety. Gibbons v.
Ogden, [22 U.S. 1 (1824)]."

Harlan's formulation covers two distinct doctrinal
elements that play essential roles in American constitutional
history. One theme, of secondary importance in this context,
articulates the division of authority between the state and
national governments in public health regulation. Harlan's
citation to Gibbons v. Ogden reinforces the point because it was
at the time the leading decision on the scope of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause." The second, which is our
primary focus, addresses how far government at either level
For a similar approach, see GOSTIN, supra note 4, at 47-51.
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
26 Id.

at 25. The references to jurisdiction may be of little concern to non-

lawyers, but they are an essential part of the overall story of health care regulation in
the United States. The case authority cited by Justice Harlan immediately after the
quotation was Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), which was concerned with the
delineation of the power of Congress "to regulate commerce . . . among the several
states...."Id. at 77.
27 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For my detailed analysis of this provision, see,
Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387
(1987).
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8 The question was
may regulate on behalf of the public health."
difficult because broad as the police power was, it was not (at
least 100 years ago) an "open sesame" that legitimated any and
all uses of government power invoking the mantra "public
health or public safety."
On the jurisdictional question, the limitations on federal
power alluded to in Jacobson have largely disintegrated.' An
expansive interpretation of commerce has defeated the
traditional effort to demarcate exclusive spheres of state and
federal regulation. In the hands of Chief Justice Marshall, the
term "commerce" received what he regarded as a broad and not
technical definition. It covered transportation and trade that
crossed state boundaries. It thus excluded all solely intrastate
commerce and trade, and more importantly, all manufacture
and agriculture, which were regarded as "local" concerns
beyond the power of the federal government."
This distribution of powers left the national government
without a general police power over these internal matters. Its
power over public health therefore had to stem from other
significant powers granted by the Constitution. The power to
raise and maintain armed forces necessarily gave the national
government influence over public health issues in military
contexts. 1 Its powers over immigration allowed it to set and
implement policies that determined which individuals should
and should not be admitted to the United States, a choice in
which issues of public health played a great role. Finally, its
power over transportation and navigation gave it some limited
power over public health matters. But all things considered,
under the basic constitutional design in place during the
formative period of this country's public health regulation, the
brunt of the work fell on the states. Chief Justice Marshall
explicitly acknowledged that truth in Gibbons when he noted

See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 205-06 (noting that state quarantine laws were
consistent with the commerce power). For a more emphatic statement of the same
point, see License Cases, 46 U.S. 504, 580-81 (1847).
" I ignore for these purposes the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that
have struck down some federal enactments as falling outside the scope of the commerce
clause. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
30 For just one indication that this was the clear understanding of commerce,
see THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
"' See, e.g., An Act Relative to Quarantine, 1 Stat. 619 (1799); 1 Stat. 474
(1796) (seeking to coordinate the execution of the federal power with applicable state
laws, acknowledged as proper under the police power). See NOVAK, supra note 12, at
210.
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that quarantine and inspection laws - designed in part as
health measures - fell exclusively within the power of the
states at the beginning or conclusion of the journey.32
The most contentious question in the earlier period,
however, did not involve federalism but rather concerned the
claims of individuals attempting to resist regulation by
government at either level. At this point, the matter of public
health gives rise to the well-known tension between individual
liberty and the common good, which became more central in
the post-Civil War period. Justice Harlan stated this point
forcefully, as well:
But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to
every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right
in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly
freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every
person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other
basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members.
Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would
soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all
could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes
the right of each individual to use his own, whether in respect to his
person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to
others."

The central task, therefore, is to explicate the
relationship between individual liberty ("real" or otherwise)
and the common good in the context of public health, including
the narrow question raised in Jacobson: When may the
government impose a compulsory vaccination requirement?
One cannot consider that question in isolation because the
same tension between individual liberty and the common good
arose in a wide range of settings during this period of
constitutional history - roughly the years between the end of
the Civil War and the constitutional crisis of 1937. In dealing
with this issue, two questions must be addressed. The first of
these concerns the correct account of public health or indeed
any other form of public good, namely those concerns that
trigger the police power. The second is the means-ends
question of whether, with the legitimate end established - say
the control of a contagion - the means in question properly
achieves the purpose.

3

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203, 205-06 (1824).

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
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On both these issues we can see a powerful
transformation from a more to a less restrictive view.
Regarding the question of public health or common good, the
original definition - not perfectly, but by and large - embraced
only those goods or bads that raised serious issues of market
failure, such that competitive markets based on strong
individual property rights could not reliably achieve anything
close to the social optimum. The rival view, which gained
momentum over this period, simply invokes the idea of the
common good or the public interest to justify state regulation
on any matter of business or social life that affects a
substantial fraction of the community; the allocative outcomes
of the competitive marketplace no longer supply a normative
baseline against which to measure the efficacy and validity of
state regulation. An enormous gulf separates these two
conceptions both on matters of general regulation and public
health. On the former, the broader view allows for extensive
regulation of competitive markets that the narrower view
limits. On the latter, public health ceases to regard only
questions of sanitation and communicable diseases, and
becomes a vast justification for any government effort to
improve the health and overall quality of life of its citizens.'

III. BUSINESSES "AFFECTED WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST": 18651937
Justice Harlan's formulation of the police power in
Jacobson did not speak of the ability of the state to regulate for
matters of health generally, but confined its powers to the
regulation of public health. Was the word "public" simply
window-dressing, so that all matters of health (public or
private, as it were) became proper objects for government
regulation, or did that term identify a limited and proper
sphere of government regulation? The choice between rival
conceptions did not arise in a vacuum, but against an extensive
legal tradition governing the relationship between private
rights and the common good. In its earliest manifestation, the
question was whether certain forms of property were to be
regarded as private or common. As early as Justinian, "natural

'4 THEODORE H. TULCHiNsKY & ELENA A. VARAVIKOVA, THE NEW PUBLIC
HEALTH: AN INTRODUCTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000).
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reason" demanded that certain forms of property be public.3
These included, most prominently, the air and the water, with
the beach as the marginal case. On the private side of the line
lay most land, ordinary movables, and wild animals whether on
land, sea, or air. All of these were unowned in the state of
nature, but could become privately owned by occupation in the
case of land, by taking in the case of chattels, and by capture in
the case of wild animals.
The initial set of rules for common property was
relatively simple because the sole function of the state was to
prevent people from excluding others. 6 However, the situation
became more complicated when widening a waterway or
building a bridge required large-scale investment in
infrastructure. No longer would rules of open access suffice.
Someone had to provide the needed capital and management.
At this point the state had only two options for financing this
so-called public good - that is, a good which has to be supplied
to all if it is supplied to even one. The state could tax and spend
or it could grant an exclusive franchise to a private firm
prepared to make the needed investment. An enormous
historical debate quickly arose as how best to fund and
construct these public goods.
The history of lighthouses neatly illustrates the matter.
Although often described as a pure public good because their
beacons benefit all users,' lighthouses were privately owned
and operated before the 1830s. The owner-operators collected
their fees from landed vessels by relying on the British customs
office with its coercive power over ships. Yet that semi-private
system did not last, replaced instead by one that financed
lighthouses out of public resources. Why the shift? In part the
answer depends on which deviation from pure market
institutions creates fewer distortions. The private lighthouses
probably were able to extract a monopoly rent for their
services, which reduced the level of trade. The taxation could
contain that risk so long as the political process limited the
amount of tax collected to the cost of the service provided. But
public administration can easily introduce administrative
See, e.g., J. INST. 2.1.pr, available at
halsall/basis/535institutes.html (last visited June 16, 2004).
3

httpJ/www.fordham.edu/

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING

INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 254-56 (1998).

" See Ronald Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357
(1974). Coase stressed the ability of private markets to fund public goods, but
downplayed the use of public power to collect the needed revenues.
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inefficiencies of its own. Whether the newer system
outperformed the older one is an empirical question.
This same painful choice between monopoly power and
taxation arose with other forms of improvements. Consider the
example of widening the channel on a single river or building a
single bridge. Once the state chose not to construct the
improvement itself, it allowed the franchisee to charge, quite
literally, what the traffic would bear, which opened the public
to the risk of monopoly exploitation.' The task was then to
limit the return without confiscating the initial investment.
Here is not the place to discuss the full range of techniques
used to approach this goal. 9 But it is critical to note that first
the English and then the American law spoke of these
monopolies as businesses "affected with the public interest." Sir
Matthew Hale" used this phrase in the seventeenth century to
explain why individuals who operated a public wharf - that is
one to which all must come to load and unload - could not
charge whatever rates they chose but had to charge rates that
were only "reasonable and moderate." Hale supplied the
decisive argument in Allnutt v. Inglis,1 a challenge to a state
monopoly in the form of a licensed customs house for goods
bound for export free of local custom duties. Lord Ellenborough
held that the licensee's monopoly power justified limitations on
rates.
There is no doubt that the general principle is favored in both law
and justice, that every man may fix what price he pleases upon his
own property or the use of it; but if, for a particular purpose, the
public have a right to resort to his premises and make use of them,
and he have a monopoly in them for that purpose, if he will take the
benefit of the monopoly, he must as an equivalent perform the duty
attached to it on reasonable terms. 2

The United States Supreme Court adopted this
principle in Munn v. Illinois," when it rejected a constitutional
challenge to the maximum rates that Illinois set for grain
For a more detailed discussion, see EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 278-318.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw, 1836-1937

(1991). For a judicial assessment of rate-making, see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,
488 U.S. 299 (1989).

' Matthew Hale, De Portibus Maris (Concerning the Gates to the Sea), in
FRANCIS HARGRAVE, A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAw OF ENGLAND
FROM MANUSCRIPTS (1787).
4
104 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1810).
"
41

104 Eng. Rep. at 210-11.

94 U.S. 113 (1876).

1436

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:4

elevators operating along-side the railroad tracks, holding that
they were "affected with the public interest." Justice Waite
quoted extensively from both Hale and Allnutt," including
Hale's reference to legal monopoly. Waite alluded to some
agreement among the grain operators, but stopped short of
calling this "virtual" monopoly a cartel, concluding that any
remedy for the operators lay at the polls and not with the
Court. 5 Justice Field, a consistent libertarian, issued a stinging
dissent to the effect that if grain elevators were affected with
the public interest, then so was every other business.6 But all
the while he remained eerily quiet on the issue of monopoly
lurking in the background.
The following fifty years produced a confused array of
decisions establishing when states could regulate prices or
rates for firms affected with the public interest, subject to a
constraint against confiscation. Public utilities were always in
the mix because of their monopoly power. 7 Eventually the
entire edifice crumbled, as the Supreme Court slowly separated
the test of "affected with the public interest" from the existence
of legal or natural monopolies.' Here it is useful to mention two
landmarks along the way. First, German Alliance Insurance
Co. v. Kansas"1 sustained rate regulation in the competitive fire
insurance industry, without so much of a hint of industry-wide
collusion. A generation later, Nebbia v. New York' rejected the
tests altogether by upholding New York's minimum prices for
milk on the ground that the dairy industry, like every major
Id. at 125-28.
5 Id. at 131, 134.

"

41 94 U.S. at 141 ("There is hardly an enterprise or business
engaging the
attention and labor of any considerable portion of the community, in which the public
has not an interest in the sense in which that term is used by the court in its opinion..
41

See Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with the Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J.

1089 (1930).
A legal monopoly is created as a matter of law, sometimes for good reason.
In Allnut, the state monopoly was created to allow the state to monitor goods meant for
the export market. To mix them with local goods would in effect encourage widespread
evasion or defeat the tax entirely. This legal monopoly is not subject to erosion by
technical innovation. In contrast a natural monopoly arises when, for example, only a
single harbor can service ships in the export trade. That monopoly is subject to erosion
if newer hulls are able to enter shallower water, for example. Allnut covered the
natural and legal monopolies alike, notwithstanding the differences between them. 104
Eng. Rep. 206 (IKB. 1810).
" 233 U.S. 389 (1914). "Indeed, it may be enough to say, without stating
other effects of insurance, that a large part of the country's wealth, subject to
uncertainty of loss through fire, is protected by insurance. This demonstrates the
interest of the public in it. . ." Id. at 413.
" 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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business, was affected with the public interest.' Nebbia
transformed a concept initially designed to limit monopoly
power into one that propped up state-sponsored cartels, in part
on the dubious public health ground that higher costs offered
protection against contamination and spoilage."2 Nebbia led to
an increase in price and a reduction in the supply of milk, with
serious negative health consequences even though one of New
York's stated purposes for the passage of the minimum price
statute was the advancement of the health of its citizens." Yet
the differences in the two accounts are manifest. The older
account used price controls to limit the effects of monopoly. The
newer account used price controls to convert a competitive
industry into a monopoly industry. Such was the bow that the
new definition of public health makes toward the old.
The problem here was not the conceptual inability of the
Supreme Court to differentiate between competition and
monopoly. One year after Nebbia sustained New York's pricefixing scheme for New York farmers, Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Incm used federalism principles to strike down New York's

" Id. at 531-32.
We may as well say at once that the dairy industry is not, in the accepted
sense of the phrase, a public utility. We think the appellant is also right in
asserting that there is in this case no suggestion of any monopoly or
monopolistic practice. It goes without saying that those engaged in the
business are in no way dependent upon public grants or franchises for the
privilege of conducting their activities. But if, as must be conceded, the
industry is subject to regulation in the public interest, what constitutional
principle bars the state from correcting existing maladjustments by
legislation touching prices? We think there is no such principle.

Id.
See id. at 516-19.
For evidence of the impact of price controls, see Dale Heien & Cathy
Roheim Wessells, The Nutritional Impact of the Dairy Price Support Program, 22 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 201 (1988) (noting that the greatest impact of price supports were on
welfare families whose consumption of calcium under regulation fell below
recommended daily amounts, but which rose above those levels with deregulation). For
some of the evidence on the adverse impact, see, for example, Kuo S. Huang, Effects of
Food Prices and Consumer Income on Nutrient Availability, 31 APPLIED ECON. 367
(1999): "According to the estimates, the [1 percent] change in income would increase
energy by 0.26%, protein by 0.267%, saturated fats by 0.385%, cholesterol by 0.314%,
calcium by 0.316%, iron by 0.212%, vitamin A by 0.354%, and vitamin C by 0.351%."
Id. at 372. See also John Adrian & Raymond Daniel, Impact of Socioeconomic Factors
on Consumption of Selected Food Nutrients in the United States, AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.,
Feb. 1976, at 31. For a description of the programs, see Kevin McNew, Milking the
Sacred Cow: A Case for Eliminating the Federal Dairy Program, POLICY ANALYSIS
(Cato Institute), Dec. 1, 1999, at 1.
4 294 U.S. 511 (1935). For a modern variation, see West Lynn Creamery, Inc.
v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994), where the Supreme Court invalidated a uniform
Massachusetts tax on all milk sold within the state regardless of whether it was
52
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differential tax on out-of-state milk, which was intended to
eliminate the entire price advantage enjoyed by out-of-state
suppliers. Congress may with impunity impose or authorize
nationwide cartels, however misguided, because such an
imposition or authorization represents national, not parochial
state interests." But when Congress is silent, free trade is the
norm. Under this new logic, antitrust laws vigorously punish
private cartels, but leave untouched state-sponsored cartels"
even though their greater durability makes them more
dangerous to the public at large. The point here is that we can
stick to the original view of Alnutt that rate regulation is the
quid pro quo for monopoly power. We do far worse in rate
regulation with the broad conception of the public interest than
we do with the narrower one. The narrow definition curbs the
misallocations from monopoly. The broad definition creates
misallocations by stifling competition in order to create cartels.
The cardinal sin of the antitrust laws thus becomes high
government policy.
My argument thus far is to show that the term "public"
effectively limits the scope of government power. It is no
coincidence therefore that those who are skeptical of the effort
to constrain the idea of public health look askance on any
defense of this narrow definition. Stated otherwise, the attack
on public health closely tracks to the progressive movement of
the early twentieth century, which exerted so much influence
on so many fronts. Novak in particular draws that explicit
connection when he criticizes my earlier defense of the old
public health on the ground that it embodies "an overriding
economic reductionism that views police power jurisprudence
through the lens of a simple calculus of economic interests,
costs and benefit." 7 That statement is meant to say in part that
I have overlooked and neglected the full range of "demographic,
psychological, social, cultural, technological, biological,
intellectual, diplomatic, legal and political" factors that make
history the complex and interactive subject that it surely is.' I
have no doubt that it is easy to find all sorts of issues on which
these esoteric points really do matter, but the question of how
produced locally or out of state, because tax rebates were only available to
Massachusetts dairy farmers.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (decided the same term as Wickard).
Novak, supra note 7, at S178.
Id. at S192.
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to understand the phrase "affected with the public interest" is
surely not one of them. In the present context, genuflecting to
history's bounty is a form of academic foreplay to the central
question: Whether these manifold sources of inspiration can
sufficiently attack the principle of freedom of contract, even
after it is adjusted to allow restrictions on contracts that
prejudice the public health or create economic monopoly."
In order to support his wide-ranging critique on the
Chicago School with its "relentless critique of regulation and
redistribution,""° Novak invokes that most overrated public
philosopher of the twentieth century - a man with impeccable
Chicago credentials - John Dewey. At the most general level,
Dewey's progressive criticism attacked all the central pillars of
the classical liberal state, with its insistence that strong and
permanent principles guide matters of political organization,
and that these principles are best understood as a combination
of the right mix of private and public property, freedom of
1 In its place, Dewey asserted
contract and limited government."
a conception of liberty that took into account changes in
socioeconomic status, downplayed formal conceptions of
negative liberty, reduced the emphasis on money relative to
nonfinancial goods, and deemphasized the obsession with
excessive individualism. Ultimately, his program defended the
progressive forms of social legislation that marked the first
third of the twentieth century. Dewey wrote: "[T]he doctrine of
'natural rights,' superior to legislative action, has been given a
definitely economic meaning by the courts, and used by judges
to destroy social legislation passed in the interest of a real,
instead of purely formal, freedom of contract."'
I think that Dewey is wrong on all his basic points, but
will pause here only to say that the principle of voluntarism
contains no nefarious subtext, but rather brings people
"' The latter was also well understood. See United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
"
Novak, supra note 7, at S193.
8' For my defense of this conception, see EPSTEIN, supra note 36. For a
progressive critique see Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923), which was a critique of THOMAS NIXON
CARVER, PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL ECONOMY (1921). Hale was defended in BARBARA H.
FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST
LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 338 (1998). For my critique of Fried, see Richard A.
Epstein, The Assault that Failed:The ProgressiveCritique of Laissez Faire, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1697 (1999).
" See Novak, supra note 7, at S180 (outlining the views of John Dewey in his
1935 book Liberalism and Social Action).
JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 26 (1935).
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together by allowing them to engage in high levels of personal
association. It is also a system that allows them to decide
whether they come together for profit, prayer, reflection, or
amusement. Nothing requires that the logic of mutual gains be
cashed out in dollars in order to be sensible, for nothing is more
common than for people (including academic lawyers) to
steeply sacrifice wages to do work that they love. What's more,
these people do it in ways that defenders of the older order
would praise, not condemn.
But my concern here is not with the caricature of
classical liberalism that pervades Dewey's thought. Rather, I
am troubled with how his focus on lofty motivations and
cultural values blinds him to the struggle taking place on the
ground right under his nose. None of the highfalutin' factors
that Dewey (and Novak) think relevant to understanding
historical progression and social legislation had anything to do
with the legal battles of this period. The battle of progressive
legislation swirled over the tense choice between competition
and monopoly as means for supplying goods and services
within labor and product markets. Recall that Nebbia
sustained minimum rates for milk as part of the statutory
system to cartelize the dairy industry. It was a state-sponsored
cartel, pure and simple. Nor was it an isolated example. The
"retrograde" judges who favored the "formal" conception of
freedom of contract took the view that competition could
outperform monopoly in the provision of services. They did so
largely - and rightly - on the traditional neoclassical ground
that monopoly reduced output and increased, as the case may
be, wages or prices, blocking many of the gains that
competition could achieve. They did not, of course, oppose
innovation and imagination, but thought that it came from
private initiative and not central planning. Dewey was not
alone in denouncing freedom of contract, which reflected the
attitude contained in much of the legislation of his day. Section
6 of the Clayton Act, for example, mirrored his attitude:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural,
or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual
help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or forbid or
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
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illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws.Y

I quote this passage in full because it indicates the
clever way in which appeals to some richer and deeper social
position prop up good, old-fashioned labor monopolies. The first
sentence illustrates the modern preoccupation with the ancient
recognition that certain items, such as gravesites, were res
extra commercium. The modern variation on that theme
attacks the "commodification" of labor that takes place through
voluntary exchange. But if that were the concern, then the
solution would be that no person should be allowed to sell his
labor in the marketplace, a position so contorted and
counterproductive that no progressive could support it. But
what rises in its stead? An exemption from the antitrust laws,
which means in effect that no combination of workers, no
matter what its economic power, can be held to act in restraint
of trade, just as the payoff portions of the statute said. It is
hard to resist the conclusion that the statute resolved the old
conflict between competition and monopoly in the wrong way,
under the bare fig leaf that this antitrust exemption served
some nobler human end.
The same holds for Dewey's lofty preference for "real" as
opposed to "formal" freedom of contract. On this point one
should examine the findings and policies in the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, the original Wagner Act, before the TaftHartley Amendments of 1947 altered it. There, one key finding
is:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership, substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce,
and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in
industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage
rates and working conditions within and between industries."

Note the statutory crutch: The showy terms "full" and
"actual" are used not to justify maintaining a competitive
structure but rather to justify institutionalizing a collective
bargaining system in which firms have a duty to bargain with a
Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 6, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 17 (2000)).
' National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000)).
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labor union once it is elected or designated as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all the workers in that unit, including that
minority of workers who do not wish representation.' All the
grand talk about higher goals has little to do with the object
and effect of this statute. The Clayton Act allowed unions to
organize but did not protect them against competition and new
entry by non-unionized workers. The Wagner Act neutralized
the threat of entry. In the history of ideas, nothing is more
dangerous than judging the effects of statutes and regulations
by the idle speculation of the philosophers who support them.
The blunt truth is that John Dewey did not know the first
thing about labor (or indeed, any) economics. Only the
uninformed could write as he did: "In general, labor legislation
is justified against the charge that it violates liberty of contract
on the ground that the economic resources of the parties to the
arrangement are so disparate that the conditions of genuine
contract are absent; action by the state is introduced to form a
level of which bargaining takes place." 7
Note once again the verbal crutch by inserting "genuine"
before "contract." Yet the maneuver cannot conceal the
economic errors that infect Dewey's work. The difference in size
between firms and workers is not the key determinant of
wages. What matters is productivity on the one hand and
market structure on the other. Multiple large firms in
competition with each other will avoid any ostensible
"disparity" of which Dewey speaks. There is of course the
possibility of collusion in mass production industry, but in that
unlikely event the cure lies in the standard enforcement of the
antitrust law. It is surely not to create monopolies on both
sides of the market, when that result only compounds the
social losses from (an occasional) monopoly with the risks of
bargaining breakdown. As matters now stand, heavy union
structure reduces the mobility of labor and creates the risk of
brinkmanship resulting in strikes and other external
dislocations. Why Novak, or anyone else, should take Dewey's
intellectual pabulum as a call to arms is beyond my
comprehension. The older definition of "affected with the public
interest," which stressed questions of monopoly, had the
evident virtue of identifying the central element in that debate.

67
67

Id.

JOHN~ DEWEY,

THE PUBLIC ANT) ITS PROBLEMS 62 (1927).
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IV. PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATION: 1865-1937 - WHY REGULATE

HERE?

The battles and misunderstandings over regulation in
the name of the public interest carry over to questions of public
health. Within the classical tradition, the key danger that
triggers regulation is communicable disease, not monopoly. The
progressive assault on the earlier conception attempts to
broaden the grounds for public health intervention, paralleling
the destruction of the once honorable conception of "affected
with the public interest." The early public health initiatives
focused on controlling communicable diseases, namely
epidemics and pollution. A key question is why should there be
regulation of communicable diseases and not of the "epidemics"
of the new public health law, such as obesity and diabetes?
The simplest way to approach this question is to ask
whether a system of private rights under a laissez-faire theory
could deal with the contagion issue." The key building blocks of
that system are the exclusive entitlement that all persons have
in their own body and property; the dominance of voluntary
contract as the means to alter those initial entitlements; and
the use of tort remedies to protect against harms that one
person inflicts against another. How might such a system treat
the risk of communicable diseases? The only weapons in its
arsenal are to either allow one person to sue a second for
damages for harms that have occurred, or to seek injunctive
relief against threatened harms. Both these private remedies
are, to put it mildly, inadequate to meet the challenge at hand.
Start with the question of whether one person could sue
another for death or injury due to communicable disease. These
illnesses stand in stark contrast to the ordinary traumatic or
sudden injury that typically has one easily identifiable cause. It
is even debatable whether communicable diseases stem from
the actions of any individual, as opposed to natural forces of
undetermined origin. Quite often, disease quickly spreads from
one person to the next without any human action (save
sneezes) at all. Once disease spreads, it becomes quite
impossible to

determine

which

person or persons were

responsible for each case of disease. This is true even today
' For the more general statement of my views, see Richard A. Epstein,
Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints,8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49
(1979); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN chs. 8, 9 (1985) (analysis of the police power).
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although we possess a solid knowledge of the mechanism of
disease transmission. Can any person who caught influenza
say from whom? These fact questions were quite beyond the
power of any legal system to resolve by piecemeal litigation 300
or even 100 years ago. In truth they are beyond the power of
our legal system today. Even if by some miracle one could
finger the wrongdoer, what is to be done if he has perished
from the plague? No one, for example, has thought that private
law suits were an appropriate response to the recent SARS
epidemic, which was successfully contained by more traditional
public health means.
Injunctions are every bit as bizarre. No longer does one
landowner seek to enjoin a flow of stench from a neighbor's
well. Here, quite literally, tens of thousands of people are both
potential plaintiffs and defendants - just who should sue
whom, and for what? Either way, then, public intervention
makes sense. If the plague is an act of God, then no one is
liable. If attributable to one person, no one could track him
down to hold him liable. In both cases some (but not all) forms
of direct regulation hold out the possibility of increasing
security for all at the expense of liberty. So long as each
regards himself as the gainer from this massive social
exchange, who should protest against it in. the abstract? The
protestors regard liberty as the sole good, so much so that they
believe people have the right to perish from cholera. Many
philosophers gravitate toward that position, but only because
they do not have the power of choice or control. The power of
the state to act in response to these public necessities is well
established. The only real question is how that awesome and
dangerous power should be exercised.
The upshot is simple: The massive breakdown in both
the theory and practice of private rights makes public remedies
instantly attractive even to people who have not gone through
any formal drill. In the easiest cases, moreover, these public
health remedies will not conflict with any conception of
individual rights. Thus it is hard to conjure up any civil
liberties objections to one of the great public health triumphs of
the nineteenth century, when John Snow discovered that the
source of cholera lay in the contaminated waters pumped from
the Thames below London's Broad Street station. Moving the
water pipes upriver to combat the pollution is the kind of
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sensible self-help measure that only a madman would protest.9
The near ninety percent reduction in deaths (from 317 per
10,000 homes to 37 per 10,000 homes) supplies the controlling
cost/benefit analysis. Likewise, only a knave would protest in
principle the use of public funds, raised by taxes, to support a
system of public drainage and sewers, including the London
rivers and the waterworks involved in Snow's cholera case. The
conflict between public health and individual liberty lies
elsewhere, most notably with quarantine and related sanctions,
such as the destruction of infected animals and goods, and with
vaccination statutes. The following subsections examine each
in turn.
A.

Quarantinesand Related Sanctions

Quarantine was a standard health protection measure
in the nineteenth century and before. Quarantine measures
were common in the American colonies before independence. °
The practice of quarantine is, in a sense, almost as old as
disease itself. As early as 1710, the English adopted a
generalized quarantine statute in response to the entrance into
England of diseased individuals from the Baltic.7 ' The ship was
a discrete unit that could be kept from port until it was
determined administratively that all the individuals on it were
free from disease. The statute's coercive aspect lay in its
warning that persons who boarded that ship "may be compelled
and in the case of Resistance may by Force and Violence, be
compelled" to return and remain on the vessel until the risk
had passed, at the expense of the ship owner, not the Crown.2
The subtle message to the owner was: Either you scrutinize
your passenger list or you can be forced to pay the costs of
mistakes.
The narrow focus on quarantine helped design the
highly sophisticated public health systems used during the
massive immigration to the United States and Canada during
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. The policy of
the time, as opposed to now, was to allow unrestricted
9 See Tulchinsky & Varavikova, supra note 34, at 25-27, for a brief account
of the episode.
70 See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Tandy, Local Quarantine and Inoculation for
Smallpox in the American Colonies, 1620-1775, 13 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 203 (1923).
71 Act to Oblige Ships Coming from Places Infected More Effectually to
Perform Their Quarentine, 1710, 9 Ann., c. 2 (Eng.).
Id. § IV.
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immigration even though the new supply of cheap labor put
immigrants in competition with domestic workers. Open
immigration policies fueled the massive movement across the
seas before the First World War. But at this point the clear
issue of the police power arises. In the case of goods, the
greatest devotion to free trade will not allow people to bring in
pests and poisons that could do real damage to people or places
in the United States. The same is true of people. Accordingly,
the key test operated to exclude people who suffered from some
contagious disease without excluding everyone else. The
system therefore required medical inspections at the docks.
Infected people were not sent home straight-away but were
sent to Ellis Island, where they were given a chance to
recuperate. If sent home, it was, as in the English case, at the
expense of the carrier, which then had an incentive to only
board individuals free of infection at the other end. Pier 21 in
Halifax, Canada operated on a similar system. That system did
a fine job of reconciling individual liberty with public health,
and showed none of the intolerance or abuse that arose in
enforcing some morals legislation. It was the lifeline for
millions, including my grandparents.
Quarantine is especially important when the fact of
infection and contagion is known but little can be done to fight
it piecemeal. Thus, as a thought experiment, no one would (or
should) favor quarantine with respect to a communicable
disease for which all individuals had perfect self-help remedies
against the threat. Indeed, in these cases the disease would be
eradicated, or at least contained, in a short time. But recall
that only in the second half of the nineteenth-century were
bacteria understood to be a causal agent for the spread of
disease. In that uncertain environment, an overbroad remedial
scheme has great advantages over an underinclusive one,
which could cause entire communities to perish, along with
their individual liberties.
Within the framework of American constitutionalism,
quarantine necessarily interfered with the ordinary liberty to
associate and to travel, but the gains to public health so
outweighed the losses that it was impossible to mount a
principled categorical opposition to this form of regulation.
Behind a veil of ignorance, everyone would opt for quarantine
when no lesser remedy could do the job. The basic laissez-faire
account of the police power holds: From behind the veil of
ignorance, everyone gains from the uniform application of
quarantine rules. So understood, this view of the police power
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was seamlessly incorporated, as Novak has noted, into the
American law.73 The Supreme Court wrote in Railroad Co. v.
Husen,' that "we unhesitatingly admit" that the power covers
the prohibition against entrance of people, animals, and goods
that carried with them the danger of transmitting any
contagious or infectious disease. 5 That power to exclude carried
with it the power to admit subject to regulations and
conditions, such as the use of reasonable inspection laws.
This same attitude helps one understand one of the
most important cases of the reconstruction era, the
6 which
Slaughterhouse Cases,"
showed the tension between
economic liberties and public health. The relevant statute
required all the slaughtering of animals in the New Orleans
area to be performed in a single district, which the Crescent
City Livestock Landing and Slaughterhouse Company set aside
for that purpose. The challengers to that district claimed that
the state-created monopoly interfered with the ordinary
occupations of life. In their view, the state monopoly offended
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment that reads: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States." The opposing view maintained that the
regulation was an appropriate public health measure because
it effectively curbed waste runoff into the Mississippi River.
As a matter of constitutional law, the case rested on the
dubious ground that the privileges or immunities of United
States citizens did not include the privileges and immunities
set out in the earlier case of Corfield v. Coryell,' including the
right to enter a trade. Rather, they included only those rights
that individuals had as citizens of the United States, such as
the ability to go to Washington to petition for redress of
79 negated
grievances. In large measure, Allgeyer v. Louisiana
that portion of the opinion by treating the broad definition of
privileges and immunities for citizens as part of the liberty for
all persons protected under the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution, again subject to the police power limitations at
play in The SlaughterhouseCases.
See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 12, at 210-11.
95 U.S. 465 (1877).
"
Id. at 472.
83 U.S. 36 (1872).
77 U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
7' 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)
(No. 3230).
71 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
"
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In dealing with Slaughterhouse, Novak stresses the
importance of the police power to a well-regulated society in
order to make light of "Stephen Field's dissenting paean to an
'inalienable right' to 'the pursuit of the ordinary avocations of
life."' But one need not knock Field's basic concern in order to
defend the legislation in Louisiana if the legislation minimized
a public nuisance, which was always a proper subject of state
regulation. Rather, the proper approach asks whether it is
possible to serve the public health objectives without infringing
on ordinary occupational liberties. On that score Novak
properly noted that Herbert Hovenkamp has made a strong
case that the Louisiana statute did work in an appropriate
fashion by allowing all butchers to ply their own trade within
the designated district or to outsource that work at legislatively
determined rates.81 This open access undercut the charge that
the district was intended to foster monopoly power. At this
point one need not claim that the police power in the post-Civil
War era received an ominously narrower interpretation than
what went before. Instead, it is accurate to say that
occupational freedom does not include the right to create a
public nuisance.
As should be apparent, a sound understanding of the
the police power lies in the details of its application.
of
scope
The key part of the overall story that Novak did not develop (in
part because it became explicit only after the period - up to
1877 - on which he wrote) is those cases where purported
police power laws fell before constitutional provisions
concerning jurisdictional and individual rights. Once again the
narrow focus on public health sharply delineates the issues. In
Husen, an 1872 Missouri law prohibited driving or conveying
Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle within the state between
March 1 and November 1 of any year. The law also required
that if owners transported and unloaded cattle by railroad or
steamboat, the owners thereof stood liable for any disease that
the cattle might cause. It also set up the presumption that
cattle infection along the route was the cause of that disease.
Notwithstanding the general recognition that the state police
power embraced quarantines, the Court struck down this
particular regulation as invading Congress's exclusive right to
'0 NOVAK, supra note 12, at 231 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,
106.

8'See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at 116-24, noted in NOVAK, supra note 12,

at 342 n.175.
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regulate commerce among the several states because the state
measure went "beyond what was absolutely necessary for its
2 Notably,
self-protection. ""
this evaluation of the limits of the
police power showed little sign of any broad communitarian
sentiment. Favoring trade over quarantine, the Court held that
the statute disrupted the national market by blocking
transportation across state lines.
Husen set an uneasy balance; recall the arguments on
the other side. A statute directed toward trade restriction
would not have targeted only areas in which cattle suffered
from Spanish or Texas fever. The real question therefore is
whether some lesser means could have detected the disease.
Here the statute exempted cattle that had wintered within the
state, presumably because they had time to show signs of
disease. The big hole in the record was whether any border
inspection could have detected infected cattle at reasonable
cost, and, if so, with what reliability. Perhaps a fuller record
could have explained why the eight-month ban was necessary,
but for these purposes, the merits of the decision are less
important than the frame of mind it evinced. Although the
police power was broad, it was by no means unlimited. Quite
the opposite, rival considerations cabined its use, especially the
maintenance of an open and competitive market.
That same narrow focus on structure of the law justified
striking down quarantine laws that subjected discrete
minorities to state-sponsored discrimination. In Jew Ho v.
Williamson,' the purported quarantine applied only to the
Chinese quarter of San Francisco. Unlike the strictures in the
1710 Quarentine Act, the ordinance in Jew Ho permitted
Anglos to go in and out of the quarantined district at will, while
the local Chinese, who had borne the brunt of many a
discriminatory law,' were required to stay put. The older cases
always asked whether the means chosen fit the narrow
constitutional end, which here they manifestly did not. The
Court thus struck down this quarantine as a sham outside the
scope of the police power."
82 R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1877).

103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (No. 12, 940).
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discriminatory rules for
laundry permits).
' See Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 26 (1900). Note that Novak mentions
the Chinatown quarantine but does not discuss Jew Ho's invalidation of it. See NOVAK,
supra note 12, at 215, 336 n.102. Gostin approves of the outcome. See GOSTIN, supra
note 4, at 213.
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The point can be generalized. So long as one holds dear
the ideals of liberty and competition, then the hard question
under the police power is how one deals with cases of mixed
motives. On these cases, I am not aware of any evidence that
the Supreme Court was so distasteful of legislative interference
that it foolishly or willfully classified health legislation as labor
legislation in order to vindicate a hidden anti-statist agenda. In
arguably the most famous case of the 1865-1937 period,
Lochner v. New York,' which ranked high in the Progressive
hit-list, the Supreme Court by a bare five-to-four majority
struck down a statute that limited the maximum work hours
for employees (but not owners) in some but not all types of
bakeries. It treated the statute as an illicit labor law, not a
public health measure, even though a few years before the
Supreme Court upheld a maximum hours statute for coal
miners." Lochner included two notable dissents with very
different implications. Justice Harlan's ponderous opinion
argued that New York's health justifications were bona fide.
Justice Holmes' classic, pithy, and wrongheaded dissent
attacked the idea of liberty of contract itself as the revival of
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics. The difference is
palpable. Once the issue was a straight labor regulation,
namely whether employers could be forced to bargain with
employee unions, Harlan switched sides and struck down a
mandatory collective bargaining statute as a labor statute.'
Meanwhile, Holmes dissented on the ground that the
conception of liberty of contract did not prevent the state from
equalizing bargaining power between the parties." It is the
exact same debate, almost to the word, that Dewey had with
the classical liberals. Today's embrace of the broader
government role rejects the view that liberty of contract
protects individual choice in competitive labor markets, so the
Lochner jurisprudence quickly collapsed.' The historical
opposition between public health and labor statutes was no
more.
At the same time, however, the appeal of competitive
federalism in the absence of congressional command has kept
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
8 See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908).
Id. at 190-92 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a
state minimum wage requirement for women).
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the distinction between protectionist legislation and health
laws robust and well in interstate matters. Thus, on public
health grounds Maine could exclude out-of-state baitfish from
Maine waters only because of the genuine uncertainty whether
these fish carried parasites that might prove harmful to native
species.9 In contrast, simply invoking the language of
quarantine did not suffice to allow one state to keep waste from
another state out of its jurisdiction.92 Note too that the
protectionist peril makes it imperative to keep this inquiry
alive, which is why the standard free trade agreements under
the WTO limit the scope of the health exemption to the free
trade rule."
As with the regrettable validation of minimum price
levels for dairy products, all these cases have public health
interests on both sides of the line. A strong protectionist,
regulatory system of dairy products would increase the costs of
these goods and thus would hurt the health of the citizens who
cannot afford to purchase enough diary. The appeal to public
health cannot trigger concern about only one type of error
(letting in harmful goods) while ignoring the second (keeping
out healthful goods). Fortunately, the Supreme Court has
reacted with appropriate skepticism at local efforts to keep out
milk, for example, that has not been pasteurized in local
facilities, so long as it has been appropriately treated at its
point of origin.' It is highly unlikely that the state of Illinois
would set low standards of safety for milk that is sold within its
state to allow a few dairy farmers the option of selling spoiled
milk in Wisconsin, where of course they could be fined and
sued for the mischief that they caused. In this case, at least,
the nondiscrimination rule was a powerful check against
health risks, which meant that Wisconsin had to make some
very specific showing of the shortfall in the out-of-state
processing for this restriction to constitutionally apply. Once
again the federalism rules observe the line between
protectionist and legitimate health legislation that could serve
as the model for dealing with regulations that apply to
individuals within a single state. The firm that sells milk in
"

See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).

See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (relying explicitly
on the pro-competitive language found in Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).
' See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
'" See Dean Milk v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1950).
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Chicago should not be kept from selling that same milk in
Peoria.
B.

Vaccination

Quarantine is only one public health measure.
Vaccination is second, and one that requires somewhat greater
medical sophistication. Here the practice began with Edward
Jenner's discovery in 1796 that exposure to the mild cow pox
rendered people immune to smallpox. 5 For most people at the
time, the only real question was how to access a vaccine that
provided strong protection against a deadly killer; the issue of
compulsion lay far in the background. Anyone who doubts this
need only look at the pictures of anxious individuals lined up in
order to receive smallpox vaccination in the scare of 1946.
But these calculations are not that clear in all cases.
Recall that the extensive discussion of the police power 100
years later in Jacobson arose because at least one individual
challenged the power of the state to vaccinate him against
smallpox. Jacobson's challenge, moreover, was not fanciful: He
claimed that in light of his family history and his severe
reaction to a prior vaccination, a second treatment would
endanger him.' His lawyer also introduced statistical evidence
indicating that the incidence of smallpox was no higher in
those states without compulsory vaccination than in those with
it - doubtless, I suspect, because of a high level of voluntary
compliance. He thus objected to a categorical order of the
Cambridge Board of Health ordering vaccination or
revaccination (for those who had not been vaccinated after
March 1, 1897) of all adults living in the town. The penalty for
noncompliance was, note carefully, five dollars.
In response, Justice Harlan did not defend the efficacy
of compulsory vaccination laws as such, but in effect followed
the lead of one of the briefs in deferring to the legislature,
which "is the only body which has the power to determine
whether the anti-vaccinationists or the majority of the medical
profession are in the right."'7 And it was on just this ground that courts cannot consider individuated evidence - that the
Court sustained the program. "Upon the principle of selfSee Tulchinsky & Varavikova, supranote 33, at 19-20.
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 36 (1905).
at 19. Deference is the issue under modern administrative law today.
" Id.
See Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to
protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens
the safety of its members."98 Harlan then duly noted that the
state could quarantine entrants into the United States who
might ultimately prove disease-free.'
However, the analogy is flawed. Quarantine involves
the ex ante uncertainty of whether a person has a contagious
disease. To make it explicit, assume that the condition is one
against which other individuals have no known means of selfdefense. At this point, the correct judgment in the face of
uncertainty is to force all individuals to suffer the lesser peril
of quarantine so as to spare others the probability of death.
In contrast, vaccination required neither detention nor
isolation. Assume for the moment that Jacobson could have
demonstrated that he, alone of all residents, was likely to die
from the vaccine, but that the local authorities simply refused
to introduce any exception into the program. Is that sacrifice
still required? Suppose further that all other individuals could
obtain absolute immunity from smallpox by taking the vaccine
themselves. At this point, the scales seem to tip strongly
against the requirement, for the availability of individual selfhelp measures undercuts the need to use compulsory
vaccination for either self-defense or public necessity. Indeed,
quarantine would achieve the same result. Far from controlling
the contagion, compulsory vaccination now smacks of unwise
paternalism that ignores all the private information that
Jacobson, quite sensibly, regarded as relevant to his choice. On
this model, the statute does not substitute a measure of
security more valuable than the liberty surrendered. The
traditional police power logic falters when effective self-help
removes the public (i.e., communicable) risk from the equation.
But what if the smallpox vaccine has partial but not
total effectiveness? Now the calculations shift back because
self-help measures cannot cut the risk of infection to zero. Just
think of a simple model in which vaccination reduces the risk
for all normal individuals by fifty percent without any ill side
effects. If the likelihood of getting the disease depends on the
number of other exposed individuals elsewhere in the
community, then compulsory vaccination is a justifiable
counter to the classical prisoner's dilemma game where each
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.
Id. at 29.
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person stands aloof counting on others to take the vaccine.
That coercion could be more critical when vaccination carries
with it some small risk, say one percent, of harmful
consequences. In this case, the uniform rule might well make
all individuals better off with universal coverage than they
would be with no coverage at all. Yet even here the calculations
must be more nuanced. If one could say with certainty that the
disease could not spread even if five percent of the population
were not vaccinated, should a lottery system be used to exempt
some? Should those of special risks be given preferred
exemptions? Should people be allowed to bid for exemptions?
The early cases do not deal with any of these
complications, but for smallpox it appears as though the
vaccine was less than perfect. Justice Harlan quotes statistics
from the 1870-1871 epidemic in Chemitz where the incidence of
smallpox was far lower among the vaccinated population than
it was among the non-vaccinated population." Yet these
numbers could be questioned: For example, some vaccinated
people could have been previously exposed to the disease. But
even so, the interdependent fortunes of those who were
vaccinated and those who were not is clear enough. If more
unvaccinated individuals had received the vaccine, the
mortality rate in the vaccinated population would have
declined. Yet even this proposition does not justify compulsory
vaccination until it is known why the substantial minority of
the population was left unvaccinated. One possibility is
ignorance, with the fatal consequence that it carried. But yet
another is that there were insufficient supplies of the vaccine
to go around. If so, then perhaps state compulsion should be
redirected to taxpayers who should be required to fund the
vaccination of the poorest segments of the population, both for
their protection and its own. If, it turns out, people have in
ignorance refused life-saving injections, then it is tempting to
endorse a dollop of paternalism, for individuals killed by

.. Id. at 32 n.1.
At this time in the town there were 64,255 inhabitants, of whom 53,891 or
83.87 per cent, were vaccinated, 5,712, or 8.89 per cent, were unvaccinated,
and 4,652, or 7.24 per cent, had had the small pox before. Of those
vaccinated, 953, or 1.77 per cent, became affected with smallpox, and of the
uninocculated, 2,643, or 46.3 per cent, had the disease. In the vaccinated, the
mortality from the disease was 0.73 per cent, and in the unprotected it was
9.16 per cent.

2004]

IN DEFENSE OF THE "OLD" PUBLICHEALTH

1455

infection cannot learn from their mistakes, even if others
might.
Nor do these larger statistics necessarily deal with
Jacobson's case, for his claim was that he was better off
without the vaccine than he was with it, for in the latter case
he was certain to be subject to serious disabilities, which in the
former case were only possible. But note the final twist: He
escaped his unwanted fate by paying a five dollar fine, which
places the term "compulsory" in deserved quotation marks. It is
not as though Jacobson had been vaccinated against his will.
So just how strong is the case for compulsory
vaccination? Most obviously, sham vaccination programs, like
sham quarantines, did not come within the police power. In the
companion case to Jew Ho, Wong Wai v. Williamson,"' the
applicable public health ordinance required vaccination of
Chinese against the bubonic plague before leaving the city.
Once again the Court struck the ordinance down because it did
not apply to the entire population. Other situations were of
course more complex. In Zucht v. King," the Supreme Court
unanimously rejected a constitutional challenge to a statute
requiring that all children be vaccinated before attending
either public or private school - which is a lot steeper than a
five dollar fine. For procedural reasons, Justice Brandeis's
decision only addressed the facial validity of the statute. It did
not consider any challenges based on its invidious
administration. It just treated Jacobson as dispositive,
notwithstanding the raised stakes. But should the state be able
to require vaccination in the absence of any particular threat of
a given disease? What kinds of individuating conditions could
defeat the application of the statute? Why should the state
have the power to ban children from attending private schools,
capable of setting their own admissions rules, when the risk of
infection or contagion is at least as great at beaches, movie
theaters, and shopping malls? We should be more uneasy about
the use of these programs than perhaps we were when Zucht
itself was decided.
C.

Morals

In order to complete the picture of the pre-1937 law on
public health, it is necessary to address briefly the "morals"
'*o' 103 F. 1 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (No. 12,937).

.. 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
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rationale for using the police power, 1° which covers areas that
count, broadly speaking, as "sinful."'' Thus the standard
protection given to freedom of action and voluntary exchange
did not carry over to such activities as gambling, idleness, and
animal abuse. Nor did those standards protect much sexual
conduct outside of marriage, including prostitution, fornication,
adultery, homosexuality, sodomy, bestiality, bigamy, polygamy,
and incest.' The laws in question not only targeted individual
practices, but also shut down as public nuisances the saloons
and bawdy houses used to organize these activities, thereby
decreasing their frequency.16
As applied to sexual conduct outside of marriage, these
rules were motivated in part by concerns with health and
safety, but also in equal, if not greater measure, by religious
denunciations of these practices, independent of their public
health consequences. So understood, much morals regulation
seems almost bizarre today: Idleness was a form of immorality
that justified shutting down a bowling alley."7 Lotteries were
(and are) terrible, unless operated by the state."' But whatever
the odd motivation, egregious overbreadth, and unruly
composition of morals cases, one side consequence of enforcing
them was reducing sexually transmitted disease even in the
absence of specific knowledge of the mechanism of its
transmission. The morals head of the police power thus served
as a somewhat useful backstop to health and safety in the
response to communicable diseases.
By now the bottom line should be clear: The legal
system had ample means to protect public health from
communicable diseases and sanitation hazards. Yet at the
same time it took steps to ensure that public health regulation
did not introduce economic protectionism or regulate labor
markets - the two central foci of the pre-1937 protections of
liberty and property. On balance, with quibbles here and there,
I think that this old balance on public health was the correct
one even if one does not presume, as does Novak, the special
o For its inclusion, see Lewis Hockheimer, Police Power, 44 CENT. L.J. 158
(1897).
000

For an extensive discussion, see NOVAK, supra note 12, at 149-89.
Id. at 156 (citing State v. Haines, 30 Me. 65 (1849)).

106

id.

'

See State v. Haines, 30 Me. 65 (1849).
See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880) (finding that the inalienable

'o

nature of the state police power allows it to terminate private lotteries granted state
charters).
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relationship between the governed and the governor. The key
point here is that the rules that limited state regulation were
as important for advancing public health as those that
authorized state regulation. I leave it for others to decide
whether this "old" system of public health was or was not
laissez-faire. The more important point is that both sets of
choices made good social sense.
V. THE MODERN PERIOD
How does the modern alternative to the "old" system of
public health measure up? The parallels to the evolution of
"businesses affected with the public interest," are quite close,
for in both areas the idea of public is unmoored from the
economic conception of a (nonexcludable) public good so as to
embrace any topic of widespread public importance. That
broader definition in turn opens the field to increased
regulation, such as mandated minimum prices in the dairy
industry, that leads to a reduction in public health by raising
the price of needed dairy products. Paradoxically, while
economic regulation over wages and prices has expanded post1937, the police power over health and morals has contracted in
the face of renewed claims of privacy, religion, and intimate
sexual conduct. To see how this pattern develops, it is useful to
go over the three areas discussed in the last section,
quarantine and related sanctions, vaccinations, and public
morals.
A.

Quarantineand SimilarSanctions

Quarantines proper have not been used in recent years
because of our general success in controlling contagious (e.g.,
airborne) diseases. The great scourge of the late twentieth
century in the United States and elsewhere has of course been
AIDS, for which quarantine is overkill, since the disease is
infectious but not contagious."n In addition, once the existence
" Quarantines are still used today in various settings. See, e.g., Melanie L.
McCall, Comment, AIDS QuarantineLaw in the InternationalCommunity: Health and
Safety Measures or Human Rights Violations?, 15 LOY. L.A. INTL. & COMP. L.J. 1001
(1993). Note that McCall refers to AIDS as a contagious disease, which implies that it
is airborne. In fact it is only an infectious disease, which can only spread through
intimate contact. That difference makes all the difference, for if AIDS were the former,
then the disease would have killed millions and the most severe restrictions against it
would have instantly been put in place. More than a word is at stake. For tuberculosis,
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of the disease is established, we can expect some natural
private responses to slow its spread: Individuals will become
more selective in their choice of sexual partners, for example,
and be more willing to take vaccines (if such are available)
when the perceived risks are high."' It hardly follows, however,
that all coercive public health measures are inappropriate
because some private responses are available. The sexual
transmission of AIDS depends, intravenous drugs to one side,
largely on the frequency of sexual contacts with multiple
partners. Transmitting the disease is more likely in its latent
stage, before either the carrier or his sexual partner knows of
the condition. In these circumstances, potential victims cannot
take defensive measures, while infected persons could take
extensive measures to disguise their condition. In this
environment, which accurately describes the world of the early
1980s, 1 ' any systemic program that might have slowed down
that rate of sexual contact would have slowed down the spread
of the disease, especially in the early years when the potency of
the virus was not tempered by effective treatments.
Yet against this backdrop we see a continued effort to
discount the compulsory use of police power regulation to deal
with the AIDS menace by invoking the threat to associational
freedom. I can recall attending more than one workshop where
the dominant theme was that AIDS was a medical and not a
social problem, as if the disease could have ever gained a
toehold if everyone were perfectly monogamous. The hard
question is what forms of public intervention make sense when
liberty interests are so clearly implicated. Here the proper
approach recognizes that there are always two kinds of error:
the danger of stopping activities that turn out to be harmless,
or allowing activities to go forward that turn out to be deadly.
In making the trade-off between these two sorts of errors, it is
a mistake to rely on any version of a precautionary principle
that attaches enormous weight to errors that allow dangerous
activities to go forward while slighting the losses associated
with the beneficial activities that turn out to be thwarted.
Those useful activities could well result in reducing accidents
see Rosemary G. Reilly, Combating the Tuberculosis Epidemic: The Legality of Coercive
Treatment Measures, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 101 (1993).
...For discussion of these measures, see Tomas Philipson, Economic
Epidemiology and Infectious Diseases, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1761
(Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse, eds., 2000).
...For the career of the notorious Gaetan Dugas, see RANDY SHILTS, AND THE
BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987).
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or disease from some other sources, which is most evident in
the case of valuable new drugs that could always be kept off
the market because they hold out some small risk of harm.
Getting the right balance is one of the hardest tasks one must
undertake. But so long as there is any uncertainty as to what
the future holds, the problem is itself inescapable no matter
what our basic political orientation. Even if we avoid the
excessive moralism of the nineteenth century, we still have to
make the same kind of hard choices. How should this be done?
Start with the bathhouses, where so much of AIDS
spread in the initial stages. 12' The traditional police power
trinity of safety, health, and morals could easily justify
shutting down these operations even without specific proof that
they facilitate the transmission of a particular disease. With
hindsight we know that the spread was in fact both rapid and
deadly. But we do not have to wait until after the fact to
understand that risk. The introduction of any new pathogen
will meet with little resistance in its early stages. The more
rapid the transmission among individuals, the more likely it is
that virulent strains will dominate over more benign ones, and
rapid transmission is what we should expect before the nature
of the disease is well known. Only when diseases (syphilis, and
now perhaps AIDS) are known sources of danger will infected
persons be more likely to die before they can spread the
disease. At that stage the slower acting and less harmful
variations will take hold, leading to an uneasy accommodation
between bacteria or virus and its human host.
This standard cycle points out that the risks of
communicable disease are greatest when the threat is
unknown, which in turn requires great diligence in dealing
with this subject. But the modern view on this subject so
magnifies the constitutional rights of intimate association"'
that the public health measures can only be justified by clear
showing of disease transmission - by which time it may well be
too late."' The better approach, it appears, is to recognize that
112 See

id.

...See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (concerning privacy
in marriage); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (concerning privacy in intimate
relationships).
"' Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), deserves brief comment. By a
five-to-four majority, it rejected the view that the right of privacy contains a right of
intimate association that insulates all actions of sodomy from criminal charges. The
decision came over the passionate dissent of four justices, who lined up squarely behind
that claim. See, e.g., Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of IntimateAssociation, 89 YALE L.J.
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the frequent sexual contacts with multiple partners are always
risky, no matter what the state of medical technology and
disease awareness. Thus, with AIDS it bears noting that one
critical boost for this viral epidemic was the effective control
via antibiotics of the various bacterial infections, such as
syphilis, that might otherwise kill their hosts before the viral
infections had a chance to spread more widely. It is well known
that the use of antibiotics always has the unfortunate collateral
consequence of hastening the mutation of a pathogen into more
resistant forms. But it is equally true that the effective
containment of one type of (bacterial) pathogen opens the door
for a second type of (viral) pathogen that is wholly impervious
to the full range of current medical treatments. It is harsh,
counterproductive, and unwise to go after individual sexual
practices, but the nineteenth century practice of targeting
institutions that facilitate harmful interactions with adverse
third-party health effects does mark out a sensible compromise
between our concern with individual liberties and the control of
infectious diseases.
A second feature of the new response to AIDS also bears
note: invoking powerful
antidiscrimination
norms in
employment, health insurance and the like for the benefit of
individuals infected with AIDS. These laws do not have any
obvious efficiency justification. If it were cheaper for the
employer to bear the loss or to provide insurance, then that
result could be achieved by a voluntary market. But that
solution is not at work here because of the intense desire to
force the employer to bear these losses without disclosure,
when they are passed on in part to other healthy employees. I
know of no important nineteenth century regulation that ever
imposed a duty to transact with others outside the common
carrier settings, where the duty to deal was set up to counter
the monopoly power of the common carrier. Even in that
context, however, the carrier was allowed as of right to exclude
high-risk (e.g., unruly) customers who cost more to service than
the norm. The system of rate regulation was designed to curb
monopoly profits; it was not designed to introduce economic
cross-subsidies between different classes of users. The modern
use of the antidiscrimination principle has the commendable
effect of offering assistance to people down on their luck. But, if
624 (1980). The dissenters have won the war since 1986. Prosecutions for sodomy will
not take place no matter what the constitution requires. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers).
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the standard literature on moral hazard is correct, as I think it
is, then it also has the regrettable dynamic effect of increasing
the likelihood (by lowering the cost) that individuals will
engage in these risky forms of conduct in the first place. In this
regard, the inability of private individuals and firms not to deal
with persons carrying disease compromises the long-term
health of everyone else, both by increasing the expected
prevalence of the disease and reducing their resources to
counter it. When we put together the two sides of the equation,
we see that direct regulation of health risks has been
weakened, while the increased regulation of market
transactions has been strengthened. Both of these tendencies
undermine public health in the broader sense of that term,
even if improvements in science and technology in part mask
these shortcomings in institutional design.
Finally, it is worth mentioning, if only briefly, that the
new set of safety and health issues often relate to exposures to
adverse conditions inside the firm, which are now regulated
under OSHA, the Occupational Safety and Health Act. In my
view, the first response should be that contract also governs
these risks and thus they do not require government
intervention. Historically, that position was not adopted in the
nineteenth century, which routinely sustained legislation that
overrode contracts on safety or health grounds.1" So much was
the undisputed premise of Lochner itself, which did not
challenge the requirement that all quarters prepared for
employees sleeping on the job be outfitted with adequate
ventilation, even though that rule could easily be used to raise
rivals' costs (that is, the cost of bakers whose workers slept on
the job relative to those who did not). But OSHA carries safety
and health regulation within the firm to a degree unheard of in
an earlier time, owing to the increased power of surveillance
that marks the modern age. But here again there is no free
lunch. Constant regulation, often on a "worst case" basis,
frequently does little to protect against the accidents and
diseases that do matter, but much to divert resources that
could be better spent elsewhere."' Just as with dairy products,
ill-advised extensions of regulatory power concern more than
finance. They also have a powerful, if negative, effect on health
and safety by diverting resources for safety measures that do
"' See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916).
...For an early account of the dangers of regulation under the worst case
principle, see Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 11.
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work into government projects that do not work, or do not work

as well.
The broad view of public health has therefore weakened
current responses to the traditional health perils. At the same
time, it seems to this outsider as though the entire public
health establishment agrees with the proposition that massive
public action should be taken to deal with the new "epidemics,"
such as obesity and diabetes.' Defenders of the new public
health, such as Lawrence Gostin and Gregg Bloche,"8 claim
that any near-exclusive fixation on communicable diseases
reflects a moral bias against certain forms of conduct and thus
ignores the harm that these practices cause. More specifically,
in writing on this subject they accuse me of laboring under a
certain form of moral blindness by stressing the harms that
arise from sexual activities while ignoring the equal or greater
dangers. "By insulating uninhibited coupling, but not eating,
from ascription of personal responsibility, Epstein takes aim at
the infamous bathhouses while putting sellers of high-risk food
beyond the law's reach.""
Here the indisputable evidence shows that more people,
both adult and infants, are overweight than before and that
changes in diet and increases in exercise could go a long way to
prevent obesity from undermining a solely individual problem.
But the use of the term "epidemic" is just the wrong way to
think about this issue. There are no non-communicable
epidemics. I am not at greater risk for obesity because an
increasing fraction of my neighbors are obese. To the contrary,
an awareness of their perilous situation may spur me onto
greater care in the conduct of my own life. The alarms over
obesity make good sense if the message is that individuals have
to worry about their personal health before they get sick, and
should not think that medical care is a panacea that will rescue
them no matter how they conduct their personal lives.
Yet designating obesity as a public health epidemic is
designed to signal that state coercion is appropriate when it is
not. Education and persuasion, yes; but private institutions
and foundation can supply these things without government
.. See, e.g., Thomas A. Wadden, et al., Obesity: Responding to the Global
Epidemic, 70 J. CONSULTING CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 510 (2002) (noting the positive
association between obesity and diabetes).
...Lawrence 0. Gostin & M. Gregg Bloche, The Politics of Public Health: A
Response to Epstein, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY MED. S160, S165 (2003).
"' Id. at S168.
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coercion and even without government guidance and warnings
over what personal health targets should be and how they are
best achieved. We need not face the specter that official tables
of ideal weights ignore obvious differences in body type, age,
and particular medical conditions. Indeed, here as elsewhere,
there is good reason to fear that the increased levels of
guaranteed health care works to undermine overall health
levels. As with AIDS, the knowledge that one is protected
against the adverse consequences of his own decisions by
unwaivable insurance will increase to some uncertain extent
the risks that individuals are prepared to tolerate. It is just a
garden variety moral hazard problem, one which does not arise
with all diseases of old age for which it is possible to obtain
insurance. There are of course many mixed cases of diseases
that respond in part to natural circumstances and in part to
poor conduct. The question of whether these are insurable is
hard to resolve in the abstract, for the proper response in some
cases is higher premiums and limited coverage. But no matter
how difficult these insurance questions, it is hard to see the
reason for any market failure so long as the insurance company
is entitled to full disclosure about the magnitude and severity
of the risk.
Indeed today the major argument for extensive
regulation of individual health practices comes from the
government's role as the insurer of (first and) last resort, not
from the fear of communicable diseases. Private insurers of
course impose such conditions and can, ideally at least, back
their preferences by canceling the coverage already provided.
Yet the government here has made the coverage irrevocable,
but has no willingness to impose explicit conditions that
exclude people for dangerous habits (e.g., skydiving) or charge
them differential rates for smoking or obesity. The language of
epidemic suggests the need for a vigorous response akin to that
of quarantine. Yet the best course would be to weaken the
public safety net that induces harmful individual behaviors in
the first event, and to replace it with a system of tailored
disincentives that do not encroach on individual liberty.
In principle, this attention to personal health prior to
medical treatment, which is the hallmark of the new public
health, does not provide a case for government intervention,
but only for personal diligence on these matters. The issue only
becomes one of public concern, paradoxically, once the decision
is made to supply publicly-funded health care to treat the
conditions in question. The most dominant characteristic of
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major public health initiatives, such as Medicare and Medicaid,
is that they make no effort to tailor premiums to perceived
risks: Smokers under Medicare do not have to pay a stated
premium, as private insurers that retain the power to exclude
individuals from coverage often require.
The upshot of all this is that the risk of cross-subsidy
introduced by the flat premium structure does supply the state
with some financial justification to limit personal choices. Yet
the daunting administrative task of deciding what restrictions
to impose and how to enforce them has left all such efforts
stillborn. The current system is one of unconditional
government cross-subsidy. The safety net granted ex post looks
only at one side of the problem: the response to illness once it
occurs. But it ignores the second side of the problem: the
increased frequency of adverse conditions. It is worth noting
that life expectancy increased more rapidly in the first half of
the past century than the second. It is quite likely that these
increases resulted from some combination of public health
measures and improved medical treatment. But better roads
and cars, safer workplaces, and better and cheaper food also
count in the overall figures. When all these are taken into
account, my own deep suspicion is that the program
championed by new public health is likely to reduce overall life
expectancy.
B.

Vaccination

The full range of issues surrounding vaccination
programs also reveal the changes of the modern approach. The
major controversy over vaccinations in the pre-1937 period
concerned their compulsory application. Typically, however, the
simple fact that most people clamored for vaccines to spare
themselves from horrible illnesses or death overshadowed the
theoretical issue. The twentieth century saw smallpox
eradicated and the full range of once-fearsome communicable
diseases - such as diphtheria, typhoid, yellow fever, and
malaria - effectively contained, at least in developed nations.
The decline of bacterial infections has ironically led to the rise
of viral infections, of which AIDS is, of course, the most
notable. Although smallpox is the notable exception, the ability
of any vaccination program to eradicate communicable diseases
is remote: The lower the perceived prevalence of the disease,
the more likely it is that people will avoid the vaccine, which
then gives the disease the opening to surge through the
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population, at which point vaccination rates increase until the
cycle repeats itself."'
In some cases the problem is still greater because of the
genuine difficulty in figuring out when an epidemic might well
occur. The Swine Flu fiasco of the mid-1970s illustrates this
difficulty."' Haunted by the specter of the 1918 pandemic that
killed over twenty million people, public health officials used
spotty evidence to rush into an ill-conceived mass vaccination
program for a swine flu outbreak that never occurred. The
program was not compulsory, but then-President Ford did
what he could to promote the vaccine use, including being
vaccinated with his family on national television. Vaccines,
alas, are not foolproof. The swine flu vaccine led to a short-term
increase in deaths followed by the widespread occurrence of the
Guillian-Barr6 Syndrome, whose progressive paralysis results
in death in five percent of the cases.
During the nineteenth century, no crash program of this
magnitude could have been mounted at all. The legacy of the
twentieth century's improved infrastructure was a mass of
liability suits based on the inadequate warnings supplied by
the government as part of its program.22 The drug companies
were well aware of the risk of these suits and they agreed to
manufacture the vaccine on a crash basis only after the
government took for itself all the risks associated with
inadequate warnings. 23' It is difficult to craft a set of warnings
that meet the strict standards of modern products liability law
when the warnings must hold for a large population that
contains pregnant women, diabetics, heart disease patients,
senior citizens, and so on. Those used were so woeful that in
litigation the United States never defended their adequacy but
only resisted liability on such issues as causation and
damages.' In public health, the perils of moving too rapidly are

120
121

For a more detailed account, see Philipson, supra note 110, at 1768-73.
For a detailed narrative, see GINA KOLATA, FLU: THE STORY OF THE GREAT

INFLUENCE PANDEMIC OF 1918 AND THE SEARCH FOR THE VIRUS THAT CAUSED IT 121-85
(1999).
122 See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (liability
for Sabin vaccine); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., Inc. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).
'" See National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94380, 90 Stat. 1113 (codified at § 42 U.S.C. 247b (2000)). The statute made the
government the sole defendant in any direct product liability action, with remedies
against the drug suppliers only for breach of contract. Id.
1
See, e.g., Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d 1299 (8th Cir. 1980); Unthank
v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984).
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often as great as those of moving too slowly. There is no refuge,
either way, from the risks of uncertainty.
Vaccines, of course, are not only used to respond to
uncertain crises. Many vaccines, such as polio vaccines or DPT,
should be used in many circumstances. In these cases, the
expansion of tort liability post-1968 has had negative public
health implications. Before 1937, it was true that many
vaccinations caused adverse side-effects, but I am aware of no
case that sought recovery for the adverse consequences either
from the physician or other party who administered the vaccine
or from the firm that manufactured it. Two explanations
account for the result. First, paradoxically, it is difficult to
persuade any jury that human error is responsible for adverse
consequences so long as technology is primitive. In order to
hold some person or entity responsible for misconduct, a jury
must believe that it knows what proper conduct is and how it
would have made a difference if employed in the case at hand.
As Mark Grady has argued, only when death in surgery or
from vaccines ceases to be commonplace does liability
increase."' In addition, when laissez-faire principles exerted
some influence on judicial behavior, a judge could easily
conclude that any vaccinated person had assumed the risk of
vaccine-related injury.
Vaccination risks are, of course, not assumed willy-nilly
by rational agents. But in many settings the overarching deal
made perfectly good sense. If there was a one-in-ten chance of
perishing from the disease, and a one-in-one thousand chance
of suffering illness or even death from the vaccine itself, then
by all means you should trade the larger risk for the smaller
one, even if you do not receive a dime for any harms that occur.
Before the modern period, that sentiment helped shape
substantive law. Regarding physicians, the usual rule of
liability required proof of negligence (which in the nineteenth
century was closer to gross negligence). In an age in which
protocols for the safe delivery of vaccines were hard to
establish, plaintiffs simply could not make this case out. In
somewhat similar fashion, the doctrine of privity halted suits
against manufacturers. Under the privity doctrine, parties
injured by a good could not sue the "remote" supplier of the
good unless the supplier had known of the imminent danger of
12

Mark F. Grady, Why are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable

Precautions,and the Medical MalpracticeExplosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 293 (1988).
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their product. 2 ' A mix of market forces and government
regulation dealt with the issue of vaccine safety.
The legal situation had changed dramatically by the
time the swine flu vaccine was prepared. 11 7 Matters of causation
were, in principle, at least better understood. Additionally, the
rise of the modern social welfare state had undermined the
intellectual and emotional appeal of assumption of risk, both in
popular thought and legal doctrine. In the previous several
years, the courts had extended modern product liability
theories to allow injured persons to bring suits directly against
the vaccine manufacturer for its failure to warn of the
dangerous side effects of the drug. The most obvious objection
to many of these cases was that the vaccine did not cause the
adverse reaction at all. In all likelihood, the injured person had
contracted the disease from nature before the vaccine had been
administered. No matter. It was all a jury question, which
presented a Catch-22 scenario. The jury had to decide both the
warning and the causation issues. If the vaccine did not cause
the injury, then a manufacturer would have no duty to warn
against side effects that did not ensue. But once a jury was
allowed, against the odds, to conclude that the vaccine did
cause the injury, then by all means the manufacturer had a
duty to warn of these side effects. The false perception of the
underlying medical situation reshaped the associated legal
duties.
The result of misattributing harm has led to sharp
increases in the price of vaccines and a concomitant reduction
in their availability."n Let a vaccine reduce the incidence of
death from one thousand to fifty cases, and the manufacturer
does not get credit for the 950 lives saved, but is charged a
hefty sum for the fifty deaths that ensued. Building the cost of
insurance for those losses back into the cost of the vaccine
results in higher prices and shortages, as the legal system
reacts as though the vaccine supplied had caused fifty deaths

12

For the classical exposition, see Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co.,

120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
discussion of the evolution, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN
127 For a
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1980).
See Richard Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for
1
Childhood Vaccines, 37 J.L. & ECON. 247, 248 (1994) (stating that the price of DPT
vaccine increased by over 6,000 percent from 1970 to 1987, a large percentage of which
goes to litigation costs).
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and saved no lives."n The only sensible way to respond to these
risks is to provide the manufacturer with some protection
against open-ended tort liability."' That could be done in two
ways.
First, legislatures could grant the manufacturers
statutory protection against law suits, which on public health
grounds trump any common law cause of action. In exchange
for that protection, the legislature could establish a
compensation fund to pay a limited sum of money to those
individuals injured by the vaccine (assuming again that the
causation issues can be resolved). But that outcome has never
quite been reached. The closest response was the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,3 which developed a
complex no-fault system of compensation, capped at $250,000,
for persons injured through vaccines; individuals with certain
specific symptoms occurring within stated time limits were
entitled to sue. But recovery under the Act is only elective,
such that anyone who chooses to spurn recovery can sue for
ordinary tort damages. On balance the number of cases that
will be resolved under the program probably has reduced the
overall level of exposure. But the dangers still remain:
Plaintiffs with weak liability cases will use the no-fault system,
while those with the stronger cases under tort law will eschew
the no-fault system. The response is halting and incomplete, at
best.
Second, in the absence of statute, the vaccine recipients
could be asked to waive their right of actions in order to receive
the vaccine. That contractual waiver could be total, or again,
could accompany some limited compensation for vaccineinduced harms. But the categorical rejection of both
assumption of risk and freedom of contract has become an
unchallenged article of faith in modern product liability
litigation. 3 ' The now-canonical view reads as follows:
"Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or
other distributors, waivers by product purchasers, and other
similar contractual exculpations, oral or written, do not bar or
" For some of the calculations of net benefit, see Peter Huber, Safety and the
Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
277, 280-83 (1985).
'" See, e.g., PAUL RUBIN, TORT REFORM BY CONTRACT 62-63 (2d ed. 1993).
131 Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3758 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 to
300aa-34 (2000)).
1"2 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 96-97 (N.J. 1960)
(rejecting standard product warranties).
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reduce otherwise valid product liability claims against sellers
or other distributors of new products for harm to persons. " "
Why? "It is presumed that the ordinary product user or
consumer lacks sufficient information and bargaining power to
execute a fair contractual limitation of rights to recover."13 Put
simply, markets never work because they always fail.
At this point we have come full circle. In my view,
restricting nineteenth century principles of freedom of contract
has had strong adverse effects on overall health by reducing
the development and supply of needed vaccines and other
pharmaceuticals that would have been brought to market. Yet
the standard public health treatises that expound the new
public health undertake no discussion of the implicit trade-offs
raised by this problem. Professor Gostin cursorily summarizes
the evolution of strict liability in tort in product liability cases,
but does not examine the specific liability issues that have
arisen with respect to vaccines. The New Public Health treatise
of Tulchinsky and Varavikova does not broach the question of
tort liability and its relationship to freedom of contract at all.'35
But the lesson still remains. The economic principles of scarcity
have as their legal offshoot the principle of correlative rights
and duties. No new rights can be created unless new duties are
imposed. The issue is whether the imposition of tort liability
and the corresponding contraction of freedom of contract make
sense in light of the dominant tendencies that they produce.
Measured in lives saved, they do not.
C.

Public Morals

The discussion of the modern view of public morals is
implicit in what has already been said. Modern discourse has
effectively silenced the older view that unregulated sexual
conduct was a public health risk that justified public coercion.
Today's prevailing view heavily emphasizes voluntary
compliance with various norms in the effort to reduce the
spread of disease, such that various institutional responses to
communicable diseases have been weakened when they are
most needed: before the identification of the threat makes
private responses sensible. The trade-offs here are no different
from those associated with the modern concerns on the trade"

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 (1998).

Id. cmt. a.
"

See TULHINSKY & VARAVIKOVA, supra note 34.
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off between liberty and security in a potential age of
(bio)terrorism. Both liberty and regulation should be
understood as principles designed to achieve overall human
satisfaction. The glorification of liberty, even for a libertarian,
is risky business when the specter of infectious diseases looms
so large on the horizons. We should not forget the concerns of
the old public health in the headlong rush to embrace the new.
VI. CONCLUSION

In one sense the debate over the proper collective
response to public health offers but one arena in which to test
the relative power of the classical liberal as opposed to the
modern social welfare model of the state. Here too I think that
the classical model outperforms its rivals. By stressing the
importance of private wealth creation through private property
and voluntary exchange, it gives individuals the resources that
allow them to take effective individual measures to insure and
promote their own health. By offering focused intervention on
matters of communicable disease, it seeks to control
externalities that private forces cannot resist. The two efforts
are not unrelated. The increase in private wealth will result in
a higher level of taxation to create the social infrastructure and
environmental control systems needed to contain these public
health risks in the first place."' Stated otherwise, one must
examine these issues from a comprehensive perspective that
understands the profound interactions between public health
and private wealth creation. The old public health, by choosing
more focused targets for government intervention, showed a
greater appreciation for these complex systematic effects.

" "Once per capita incomes get to about $8,000 per year, nations start
aggressively improving their environments." James K. Glassman, A Bright Idea on
Development, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2002, at A12.

